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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and earnings man-
agement practices in Greece. The ownership structure of Greek firms is characterized 
by the dominance of families whose influences have naturally a serious impact on 
management decisions directly or indirectly. Existing literature indicates that owner-
ship structure could limit the manipulation of reported earnings but it could also pro-
vide the incentives to manage earnings. Thus, the main purpose of this study is to in-
vestigate whether a company’s ownership structure, which is measured with three 
variables (family ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership), mitigate 
or exacerbate earnings management practices, which are measured with two methods 
(discretionary accruals, real activities manipulation). Using a sample of 70 Greek listed 
firms for the five-year period, 2011 to 2015, we find that discretionary accruals and 
real activities manipulation as proxies for earnings management is positively associat-
ed with family ownership, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. The em-
pirical findings of this study suggest that family ownership, managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership exacerbate earnings management strategies and as a conse-
quence, reduce the quality of reported earnings. 
Keywords: (Earnings management, Ownership structure, Discretionary accruals, 
Real activities manipulation) 
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1. Introduction 
Up to now, a crucial characteristic of the economic world is the asymmetry of 
information between management and shareholders. Due to the fact that the interests 
of managers and shareholders are not necessarily aligned, the asymmetry of infor-
mation can cause managers to manipulate earnings for their own benefit at the ex-
pense of other stakeholders. According to agency theory, corporate governance mech-
anisms can be used as monitoring tools by shareholders in order to mitigate such op-
portunistic behaviors by managers. 
Accounting earnings is one of the most important indicators of firm’s financial 
performance. Consequently, there is a large volume of published studies regarding the 
phenomenon of earnings management. These studies have investigated mainly the 
incentives of earnings management, including: protection from political costs (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986; Han and Wang 1998), losses avoidance (Burgstaher and Bichev 
1997), an attempt to avoid contractual debt violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), 
compensation contracts (Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan 1995), season equity offerings 
(Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998b), meet analysts’ forecasts (Athanasakou, Strong and 
Walker 2009), initial public offerings (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a), management 
buyouts (Perry and Williams 1994) as well as stock-financed acquisitions (Koumanakos 
et al. 2004; Erickson and Wang 1999). 
Nonetheless, there is also a variety of factors that limit the manipulation of re-
ported accounting information. Indeed, Dechow et al. (1996) and Jiambalvo (1996) 
suggested that there are certain corporate governance factors, including earnings 
management, which have an impact on corporate accounting behavior. For instance, 
Balsam et al. (2002) argue that institutional investors are more likely to detect manipu-
lation of reported earnings than non-institutional investors, in the sense that they are 
sophisticated investors and they have more access to relevant information. Dechow et 
al. (1996) state that large blockholders could improve a company’s financial statement 
credibility since they provide a detailed examination over the firm’s earnings manage-
ment activity. Furthermore, Warfield et al. (1995) find that managers who possess a 
   
  -6- 
significant portion of equity stakes of a company have less incentive to manage re-
ported earnings. All the aforementioned studies indicate that a company’s ownership 
structure has a serious impact on the magnitude of earnings quality as well as earnings 
management. 
In this study, we investigate the effect of ownership structure on a company’s 
earnings management strategies in Greece. For this purpose we consider three types 
of ownership (family ownership, managerial ownership and institutional ownership) 
and we measure earnings management with two methods (discretionary accruals and 
real activities manipulation). Using a sample of 70 Greek listed companies over a 5-
year period, from 2011 through 2015, we find evidence that family ownership, mana-
gerial ownership and institutional ownership increase management flexibility in ma-
nipulating reported earnings. Therefore, this survey suggests that the high ownership 
concentration in Greece is associated with a high level of earnings management, in the 
sense that the ownership structure of Greek listed firms exacerbates earnings man-
agement. 
There is plenty of literature examining earnings management activity in econ-
omies with Anglo-Saxon financial systems (US, UK), but not as much concerning small 
stock markets such as the Greek market (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 2007). What 
makes the Greek market case a unique one about the effect of ownership structure on 
an entity’s earnings management activity is that the ownership of Greek listed firms is 
highly concentrated and more specifically family – controlled, while the ownership of 
the Anglo-Saxon (US, UK) listed firms is widely dispersed. Accordingly, La Porta et al. 
(1999) find that 65% of the 20 largest Greek companies are dominated by a few fami-
lies, while 30% are controlled by the government and the remaining 5% are widely dis-
persed. On the contrary, 80% of the 20 largest US companies as well as 90% of the 20 
largest UK companies have no controlling shareholder. Furthermore, consistent with 
CMC (2001a, 2001b), the dispersion of shares, regarding Greek listed firms, is about 
47% when shareholders who possess at least 5% of outstanding shares are considered. 
These findings provide evidence that the company’s management is controlled by only 
a few shareholders. They also indicate that medium- as well as small-sized companies, 
in Greece, are normally dominated by families where ownership and control are not 
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separated. Moreover, according to Leuz et al. (2003), countries with highly-
concentrated ownership, small stock markets and poor investor protection display 
higher levels of earnings management than Anglon-Saxon (US, UK) economies with 
widely dispersed ownership, larger stock markets as well as stronger investor protec-
tion. Leuz et al. (2003) find that among their 31-countries sample, Greece, exhibits the 
highest level of earnings management. All the aforementioned findings show that 
Greece constitutes a natural laboratory for analyzing the effect of ownership structure 
on a company’s earnings management strategies. 
This survey makes several contributions to the existing literature regarding 
earnings management. First, although a few studies have been conducted concerning 
mainly US and UK data about the correlation between ownership structure and earn-
ings management, to our knowledge, there is no study in Greece that examines this 
issue. This fact will result in the increase of knowledge regarding that phenomenon 
and it will add to the exceptionally limited empirical evidence about this association in 
the frame of a small European capital market like Greece. Second, the results of this 
research could provide stakeholders with important information regarding earnings 
management. More specifically, all users of financial statements may find this study 
useful since it analyses a subject of financial reporting and as a result it will be useful in 
making economic decisions. Finally, the findings will also be of a great value for regula-
tors since they could improve the quality of financial reporting as well as the corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
The remainder of this survey is constructed as follows. In the next section we 
describe the related literature and the hypotheses development. The research design 
is explained in the third section while the main results and the results of the sensitivity 
analysis are reported in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section concludes the 
study. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we summarize the literature on corporate ownership structure. 
Afterwards, we develop our hypotheses making the connection between ownership 
structure and earnings management. 
2.1.  Related Literature 
As indicated by agency theory, separation of ownership and control prompts a 
divergence in the search for managerial interests as opposed to owners’ interests (Jen-
sen and Meckling 1976), and as a result monitoring managerial judgments tends to be 
crucial in ensuring that shareholder’s interests are secured, and to assure reliable and 
complete financial reporting. Corporate governance offers a set of restraints to lessen 
the agency costs, which arise from the contractual relationship in a firm or a frame-
work to assure that the financiers achieve a return on their financial investment 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Bushman and Smith (2003) indicated that the role of corpo-
rate governance, in terms of financial reporting, is to assure compliance with financial 
accounting system as well as to sustain financial statement credibility. Therefore, 
properly structured mechanisms of corporate governance are supposed to decrease 
earnings management since they constitute an effective monitoring tool of manage-
ment in the financial reporting process. Moreover, several studies such as that con-
ducted by Dechow et al. 1996 (see also Jiambalvo 1996) have shown that certain cor-
porate governance mechanisms could mitigate earnings management and as owner-
ship structure is considered to be a significant one, it could have a monitoring role in 
diminishing earnings management activities. Existing literature argues that different 
ownership structures are correlated with the quality of earnings, and consequently, 
earnings management in the sense that earnings quality is high with no earnings man-
agement activities (Dechow et al. 2002). For instance, ownership concentration, which 
is associated with the asymmetry of information between managers and investors, in-
fluences the quality of earnings and the accounting choices of managers (Donelly and 
Lynch 2002; Fan and Wong 2002). Insider ownership may have a positive (Cheng and 
Warfield 2005) or a negative effect (Warfield et al. 1995) on earnings management. 
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Lastly, there are also other studies which have analyzed whether institutional investors 
affect earnings management (Koh  2003; Ebrahim 2007). 
In order to examine whether a company’s ownership structure constitutes an 
effective monitoring tool for earnings management, three types of ownership are con-
sidered: family ownership, managerial ownership and institutional ownership.  
2.2. Family ownership and Earnings Management 
Across countries, including Greece, family members possess a significant repre-
sentation on the board of family-controlled companies as well as accounting for a 
great proportion of CEOs and chairmen. Hence, this kind of firms could have inefficient 
monitoring through the board which weakens its corporate governance. Due to this 
family ownership domination, family-controlled firms are noted for the second type of 
agency problem that is between the minority and controlling shareholders (Claessens 
and Fan 2002). Controlling families, under the entrenchment effect, may try to expro-
priate the minority shareholders for their own benefit (Fama and Jensen 1983). Fur-
thermore, the entrenchment effect may create higher asymmetry of information be-
tween controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, controlling fami-
lies have the appropriate incentive, as well as the opportunity, to manipulate earnings 
for their personal ambitions which could lead to inferior financial reporting quality (Gul 
et al. 2003; Chung et al. 2004). Accordingly, Bertrand et al. (2002) documented that 
there is sufficient evidence of expropriation of minority interests by family members, 
particularly where the voting rights of these members who control the firm significant-
ly surpass their cash flow rights (see also Gao and Kling 2008). In this vein, Fan and 
Wong (2002) propose that the probability of earnings management existence is higher 
among companies in which ownership is converged in the hand of large shareholders 
like families. 
However, according to the alignment effect, both family member and minority 
interests are significantly correlated because of the large amount of stocks held by 
family owners and their long-term existence. As a result, due to the alignment effect, 
there is a lower probability that minority shareholders would be expropriated by fami-
ly members throughout manipulation of earnings. Anderson and Reeb (2003) docu-
   
 -10- 
mented that the wealth of the controlling family is greatly tied with firm value, and 
hence, family members have a strong tendency to monitor managers or employees. 
Additionally, earnings management activities are mostly short-term oriented and this 
fact may be unfavorable to the long-term firm operation. Thus, long-term orientation, 
as well as reputation protection, restrains firm management from manipulating earn-
ings in the sense that the pressure on them to meet short-term financial goals could be 
limited. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggested in their study that stricter monitoring 
mechanisms of corporate governance are more commonly used among board of direc-
tors of family firms. In this manner, as Anderson et al. (2003) noticed, family owners 
interact more efficiently with minority shareholders and creditors, producing higher 
financial reporting quality as well as decreasing debt cost. Again, in line with the 
alignment effect, Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicated that family companies are per-
forming way better than non-family companies due to their sturdier corporate govern-
ance and inferior cost of debt. Overall, a number of studies (Wang 2006; Ali et al. 2007; 
Bona-Sanchez et al. 2011; Jiraporn and DaDalt 2009) have shown that family-
controlled companies are significantly associated with lower likelihood of earnings 
management and higher quality of earnings compared to non-family firms. 
As mentioned before, Leuz et al. (2003) find that among their 31-countries 
sample, Greece, exhibits the highest level of earnings management. Moreover, the ma-
jority of Greek companies are controlled by families (see La Porta et al. 1999). There-
fore, consistent with the entrenchment effect, this project proposed a positive rela-
tionship between earnings management and family ownership, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of family ownership in the company is positively as-
sociated with earnings management. 
2.3. Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management 
The literature on agency theory suggests that equity stakes owned by manag-
ers help associate their interests with those of shareholders due to the interest align-
ment effect (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This effect implies that opportunistic mana-
gerial behavior declines monotonically as managerial ownership rise, and consequent-
ly, corporate performance increases while earnings management decreases.  Thus, in-
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sider ownership may be interpreted as a mechanism to constrain such opportunistic 
behaviors by managers, and hence, the extent that they manipulate earnings is ex-
pected to be significantly negatively correlated with insider ownership. In this sense, 
many authors (Ali et al. 2008; Ebrahim 2007; Klein 2002; Warfield et al. 1995; 
Banderlipe 2009) indicated that managerial ownership is correlated with lower levels 
of earnings management. 
Nevertheless, according to the management entrenchment effect, higher 
shareholdings held by managers could grant them great power to pursue their person-
al interests without fear of punishment (Fama and Jensen 1983; Weisbach 1988). 
Therefore, the entrenchment effect proposes that CEO’s shareholdings, instead of de-
creasing managerial incentive problems, may lead to increasing managerial opportun-
ism. In this vein, the results of previous surveys show that managers manipulate earn-
ings to maximize their personal fortune (Healy 1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Guidry 
et al. 1999). Specifically, managers with high shareholdings would gain from earnings 
management by keeping stock prices high and rising the value of their shares (Yang, Lai 
and Tan 2008). Hence, higher managerial ownership could provide managers with the 
incentives to use discretionary accruals in order to improve earnings, and as a result, 
the value of their stocks. Morck et al.(1988) document that low and high levels of 
managerial ownership indicate that management interests are aligned with those of 
shareholders, while moderate levels of managerial ownership suggest dominance of 
the entrenchment effect in the sense that managers would have greater incentives for 
opportunistic behavior (see also Short and Keasey 1999. Several surveys (Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Mitani 2010; Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010) reported that companies with 
higher managerial ownership are correlated with more earnings management.  
Since, in most cases, we find that managers of family companies are also mem-
bers of the controlling families owning the majority of shares, we expect a positive re-
lationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. Therefore, our 
hypothesis 2 is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings 
management. 
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2.4. Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management 
Agency theory proposed that monitoring by institutional investors can be an 
important mechanism of governance (the efficient monitoring hypothesis). According-
ly, Almazan et al. (2005) state that institutional ownership plays an active role in moni-
toring management, which is a difficult task for passive or less-informed investors. 
Moreover, institutional investors have the appropriate capital and ability to monitor 
managers. Thus, according to the efficient monitoring hypothesis, institutional owner-
ship is correlated with a favorable way of monitoring management, diminishing agency 
costs and the ability of managers to manipulate earnings for their own ambitions 
(Chung et al. 2002). There is a large volume of published studies based on the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis which proposes an inverse relationship between earnings man-
agement activity of a company and its institutional share ownership (Koh 2003; Bushee 
1998; Ebrahim 2007; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Cornett et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, a number of authors argue that institutional investors can-
not provide active monitoring to management activities (Porter 1992; Claessens and 
Fan 2002). Bushee (1998) pointed out that institutional owners are incapable of moni-
toring management since they are mainly concentrated on short-term financial results. 
They may even collude with managers (Pound 1988) or exercise sufficient pressure on 
them to meet those short-term expectations. Therefore, these influences indicate that 
institutional investors might be unable to vote against managers by exerting monitor-
ing efforts, and consequently, they could impel indirectly management to manipulate 
earnings (Charitou et al. 2007; Agnes Cheng and Reitenga 2009). 
Consistent with the latter point of view, we expect that there is a positive rela-
tionship between institutional ownership and earnings management in the sense that 
Greece exhibits very high levels of earnings management and institutional investors’ 
apathy may be a reason for this result. Thus, our hypothesis 3 is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of institutional ownership in the company is posi-
tively associated with earnings management. 
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3. Research Design 
In the beginning of the research design section, our data selection criteria are 
explained. 
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of all companies whose stocks are listed in the Ath-
ens Stock Exchange (ASE) during 2011 (n = 234). Since we are examining the five-year 
period 2011 to 2015, the final sample has been developed as follows:  
Firms which are regarded as finance-related firms (including real estate firms, n 
= 25) are excluded. The reason lies in the fact that this kind of firms is subjected to dif-
ferent disclosure requirements, in the sense that the estimation of discretionary ac-
cruals as well as real activities manipulation may be problematic, according to extend 
literature. Moreover, companies whose share trading is in temporary suspension (n = 
35) are excluded. Furthermore, firms whose share trading is under surveillance (n = 
40), in at least one year during the five-year period 2011-2015, are excluded from the 
sample. Companies which were delisted during the aforementioned period are also 
excluded (n = 23). Finally, firms with missing data that are necessary for the develop-
ment of our variables are excluded (n = 41), too. Consequently, our final sample con-
sists of 70 non-financial companies and, hence, 350 observations in total. Table 1 pre-
sents the sample selection criteria for this survey. 
Financial information on all the necessary variables is collected from Amadeus 
Database as well as companies’ Annual Reports. Furthermore, information regarding 
ownership structure is hand collected from the ASE’s website (www.helex.gr). 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Criteria 
Criteria Number of firms 
Non-financial companies which are listed in ASE (2011) 234 
Less  
Finance-related firms (including real-estate firms) (25) 
Companies whose share trading is under temporary suspension (35) 
Companies which were delisted within the period 2011-2015 (23) 
Companies whose share trading is under surveillance (40) 
Companies with missing data (41) 
Final test sample 70 
3.2. Measurement of Ownership Structure and Other Variables 
As we continue on the research design section, the measurement of our main 
and other control variables is explained. Finally, we present our empirical models. 
3.2.1. Measuring Ownership Structure 
As mentioned previously, to examine whether a company’s ownership struc-
ture constitutes an effective monitoring tool for earnings management, we use three 
variables: family ownership, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Con-
sistent with Faccio and Lang (2002), family ownership (FAM) is measured as the pro-
portion of the company’s stocks directly or indirectly owned by a family, an individual 
or an unlisted firm. All the selected family firms are controlled by the largest share-
holder who holds at least 10 percent of equity stakes or voting rights, so as to ensure 
that a family controls the particular firm. This is again consistent with prior studies 
(Faccio and Lang 2002; see also LaPorta et al. 1999). The managerial ownership 
(MANAG) is measured as the proportion of the firm’s shares directly or indirectly pos-
sessed by the manager. At this point, it is worth mentioning that almost in all cases of 
a family firm, we find that the managers of the family firm (CEO or CFO) are also mem-
bers of the controlling family. Finally, the institutional ownership (INSTIT) is calculated 
as the proportion of firm’s stocks owned by institutional investors (including finance 
companies, investment companies and insurance companies) who possess at least 5% 
of common stock. 
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3.2.2. Measuring Earnings Management 
A great deal of previous studies on earnings management (e.g. Kothari et al. 
2005; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Jones 1991) employ measures of discretionary 
accruals as substitutes for earnings management and earnings quality. In this vein, we 
use discretionary accruals as our first surrogate for earnings management. Consistent 
with DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) , the cross-sectional variation of the Modified 
Jones model will be employed in this research due to its less restrictive data require-
ments as well as its superior specification (see also Dechow et al. 1995; Koh 2003; Klein 
2002). The modified Jones model involves regressing total accruals on the difference 
between the change in revenues and the change in receivables1 as well as the level of 
gross property plant and equipment. Those variables, including the intercept, are di-
vided by lagged total assets so as to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. 
The modified Jones model is the following: 
      
      
    
 
      
     
             
      
     
     
      
                              
Where, 
TACCit  = total accruals of firm i for period t, measured as the difference between net 
income and cash flow from operations. 
TAit = lagged total assets. 
ΔREVit = change in revenues. 
ΔRECit = change in accounts receivable. 
PPEit  = gross property, plant and equipment. 
i,t = firm and time subscripts. 
εit = residual term. 
It should be noted that the value of discretionary accruals variable (DACCR), which is 
used for our analysis, can be either positive or negative since earnings management 
                                                        
1 This difference between the change in revenues and the change in receivables is used in order 
to adjust the change in revenues for the change in receivables. 
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could implicate income-decreasing as well as income-increasing accruals. The value of 
the DACCR variable is simply the residual2 from the ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mation of model (1). 
3.2.3. Measuring Real Activities Manipulation 
Real activities manipulation is interpreted as management actions that depart from 
normal structured transactions and financial reporting practices undertaken in order to 
meet or beat certain earnings thresholds (see Roychowdhury 2006; Kim et al 2012). 
Following previous studies (e.g. Kim et al 2012; Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury 
2006) we construct our proxies for real activities manipulation. More accurately, to 
detect real activities manipulation we employ the following four measures: 
1. Abnormal levels from operating cash flows (ABN_CFO). Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
model is used to measure the normal level of cash flow from operations, as fol-
lows: 
 
    
     
       
 
     
     
  
     
     
   
     
                             
Where, 
CFOt = operating cash flows in year t. 
TAt-1 = lagged total assets. 
St = net sales in year t. 
ΔSt = difference between net sales and lagged net sales (St – St-1). 
For each firm-year, abnormal operating cash flows (ABN_CFO) are simply the 
residual (i.e., εt) from the estimation of the equation (2). 
 
                                                        
2
 While the value of non-discretionary accruals, NDACCR, are the predictions from the OLS (Or-
dinary Least Squares) estimation of model (1). 
   
 -17- 
2. Abnormal production costs (ABN_PROD) are the second measure of real activities ma-
nipulation. According to previous studies (Kim et al 2012; Cohen et al. 2008; 
Roychowdhury 2006), production costs are interpreted as the sum of cost of goods 
sold (COGS) and change in inventory (ΔINV) through the year. Following those surveys, 
we estimate model (3) for normal cost of goods sold (COGS): 
 
     
     
       
 
     
    
  
     
                                                             
Where, 
COGSt = cost of goods sold in year t. 
TAt-1; St = as defined previously. 
 
In this vein, we estimate model (4) for normal inventory growth: 
     
     
       
 
     
     
   
     
     
     
     
                                 
Where, 
ΔINVt = change in inventory in year t. 
ΔSt-1 = lagged change in net sales. 
TAt-1; ΔSt= as defined previously. 
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), Roychowdhury (2006), Kim et al. (2012) 
and Zang (2012), production costs are defined as PRODt = COGSt + ΔINVt. Using 
models (3) and (4), we measure normal production costs (model (5)) where ex-
penses are expressed as a linear function of contemporaneous net sales: 
     
     
       
 
     
     
  
     
     
   
     
     
     
     
     
              (5) 
Estimating the residual from model (5), we come up with abnormal production 
cost (ABN_PROD). 
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3. The abnormal discretionary expenses (ABN_EXP) are the third measure 
of real activities manipulation. Again, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), 
Roychowdhury (2006), Kim et al. (2012) and Zang (2012), we estimate model 
(6) for normal discretionary expenses: 
 
       
     
       
 
     
    
    
     
                                                          
Where, 
DISEXPt = discretionary expenses in year t, interpreted as the sum of Ad-
vertising, Research and Development, and Selling General and 
Administrative Expenses. 
TAt-1; St-1 = as defined previously. 
For each firm-year, we measure abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABN_EXP) 
by estimating the residual from model (6). 
4. Finally, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2012), we develop a 
combined measure of real activities manipulation consisting of the aggregation 
of ABN_CFO, ABN_PROD and ABN_DISEXP which are the three individual prox-
ies for real activities manipulation as defined previously. Following the afore-
mentioned author, we calculate the combined measure of real activities ma-
nipulation, COMB_RAM, as ABN_CFO – ABN_PROD + ABN_DISEXP: 
 
COMB_RAM = ABN_CFO – ABN_PROD + ABN_DISEXP        (7) 
3.2.4. Empirical Models 
We evaluate the relationship between ownership structure and earnings man-
agement by calculating the following OLS regressions: 
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             (8) 
                                                      
                                       
              (9) 
Where, 
DACCR = the value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are 
calculated according to the cross-sectional modified Jones model. 
COMB_RAM = ABN_CFO - ABN_PROD + ABN_DISEXP. 
 ABN_CFO = abnormal operating cash flows. 
 ABN_PROD = abnormal production costs, where production costs are  
interpreted as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in in-
ventory. 
ABN_DISEXP = abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expens-
es are the sum of Advertising, Research and Development, and 
Selling General and Administrative Expenses. 
FAM = proportion of company’s stocks directly or indirectly owned by a fami-
ly, an individual or an unlisted firm that possesses at least 10 percent of 
equity stakes or voting rights. 
MANAG = proportion of firm’s shares directly or indirectly possessed by the 
manager (CEO or CFO). 
INSTIT  = proportion of firm’s stocks owned by institutional investors who 
possess at least 5% of common stock. 
MB  = market value of equity to book value of equity ratio. 
LEV  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
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ROA  = net income to total assets ratio. 
BIG4  = dummy variable: 1 if the auditor is one of the big 4 companies and 0  
  otherwise. 
ε  = residual term. 
α0  = constant. 
α1 to α10 = coefficients. 
3.2.5. Control Variables 
Companies probably employ a combination of real activities manipulation and 
discretionary accruals as tools in order to manipulate their reported earnings. Alterna-
tively, companies can choose between those two mechanisms employing the one that 
is less costly to them (Cohen et al. 2008). According to Zang (2012), the trade-off be-
tween those two earnings management mechanisms is a function of their relevant 
costs. Therefore, following Kim et al. (2012) and Cohen et al. (2008), we include a sur-
rogate for accrual-based earnings management technique (DACCR) as a control varia-
ble in COMB_RAM (real activities manipulation) regression and a surrogate for real ac-
tivities manipulation technique as a control variable in the DACCR (accrual-based earn-
ings management) regression. The reason lies in the fact that we need to control for 
the substitutive nature of the aforementioned earnings management methods. 
Given that the selected ownership structure, consisting of Family, Managerial 
and Institutional ownership, is not the sole factor affecting real activities manipulation 
and discretionary accruals, we introduce several other control variables so as to isolate 
other contradicting incentives that could influence the accounting choices of manag-
ers. 
Prior studies (for example, McNichols 2000) indicate that growth is significantly 
positively associated with earnings management and hence, rapidly growing compa-
nies are expected to employ a greater level of earnings management. Therefore, this 
   
 -21- 
research includes the control variable, MB, which is estimated as the market value of 
equity to book value of equity, to represent the growth rate of companies. 
A leverage ratio is included in the model to proxy for a company’s proximity to 
the violation of the contractual debt restraints since managers are more likely to ma-
nipulate accounting earnings when they are closer to default such debt restraints. Ac-
cording to Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Bedard et al. (2004), as companies are 
closer to their accounting-based debt covenants, firm’s management is more likely to 
use aggressive earnings management methods to prevent default of these debt cove-
nants (debt hypothesis). Yang et al. (2008), Chung et al. (2002) and Paesnell et al. 
(2000) find that leverage and earnings management are negatively associated. The 
control variable, LEV, is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
Return on assets is also included as a proxy for profitability. Prior studies sug-
gested that firms with lower profitability are more engaged in earnings management 
(Chen et al. 2007). Indeed, other surveys found that firms with higher profitability have 
lower earnings management activity (Klein 2002; Bedard et al. 2004). Therefore, this 
research uses a control variable, ROA, which is measured as the ratio of net income to 
total assets. 
Finally, according to earlier studies (e.g. Chi et al. 2011), Big 4 auditors are more 
likely to detect and document material errors and irregularities in firms’ financial 
statements. Moreover, lower audit quality is found to be related with a greater level of 
“accounting flexibility”. Hence, a dummy variable, BIG4, is employed to take account 
for the effect of auditor quality in earnings management. 
4. Results 
In this section, we present our findings of the empirical analyses (including de-
scriptive statistics, regression results and Spearman correlations) and then we inter-
pret them. 
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4.1. Empirical Analyses 
At the beginning of the empirical analysis, the descriptive statistics of our vari-
ables are presented below in Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum St. Deviation 
DACCR 0.00000 0.000195 -0.10696 0.26761 0.04175 
FAM 0.38263 0.389400 0.00000 0.86310 0.31631 
MANAG 0.35612 0.334300 0.00000 0.86310 0.26438 
INSTIT 0.06098 0.00000 0.00000 0.85065 0.17430 
COMB_RAM 0.00000 0.034947 -7.11552 0.57705 0.59092 
MB 4.60932 0.363314 -5.27240 525.76323 35.96552 
LEV 0.19850 0.172658 -0.15748 0.64424 0.15208 
ROA -0.026978 -0.023150 -0.374800 0.221100 0.068433 
Dummy Variable      
BIG4 0.145714 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.353325 
DACCR, the value of discretionary accruals; FAM, family ownership; MANAG, managerial ownership; 
INSTIT, institutional ownership; COMB_RAM, real activities manipulation; MB, market to book value ratio; LEV, long-
term debt to total assets ratio; ROA, net income to total assets ratio; BIG4, dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by 
Big 4 auditors; 0 otherwise). 
Number of observations: 350; Period: 2011-2015. 
The analysis of Table 2 indicates that the mean values of the two dependent 
variables (DACCR and COM_RAM) are extremely close to zero and their interpretation 
will be presented in the next section. The mean (standard deviation) of variables FAM, 
MANAG and INSTIT are 0.38 (0.32), 0.35 (0.26) and 0.06 (0.17), respectively. Moreover, 
the mean values (standard deviation) of variables MB, LEV and BIG4 are 4.6 (36), 0.2 
(0.15) and 0.15 (0.35), respectively. 
The next stage of our empirical analysis presents the results of the regressions. 
First, model (8), in which DACCR is the dependent variable and COMB_RAM is the in-
dependent variable (as well as the rest of the variables mentioned in section three), is 
estimated. The coefficients are estimated with the ordinary least squares method 
(OLS) as demonstrated in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: OLS Regression Results – Discretionary Accruals 
Variable Coefficient 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
COMB_RAM -0.003037 
-2.037804** 
(0.0426) 
FAM 0.020465 
5.313816*** 
(0.000) 
MANAG 0.033850 
-2.636542*** 
(0.0089) 
INSTIT 0.017479 
2.457188** 
(0.0146) 
MB -0.000045 
-0.151406 
(0.8798) 
LEV -0.007599 
-0.876465 
(0.3816) 
ROA 0.223755 
3.290731*** 
(0.0011) 
BIG4 -0.000465 
-0.180826 
(0.8566) 
C 0.010931 
2.442663** 
(0.0152) 
Adjusted R2                        0.139842 
Number of observations: 350; Period: 2011-2015; COMB_RAM, real activities manipulation; FAM, family 
ownership; MANAG, managerial ownership; INSTIT, institutional ownership; MB, market to book value ratio; LEV, 
long-term debt to total assets ratio; ROA, net income to total assets ratio; BIG4, dummy variable (1 if a firm is audit-
ed by Big 4 auditors; 0 otherwise) 
***, **, * Indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
The analysis of Table 3 shows that the coefficient of the explanatory variable 
COMB_RAM is statistically significant at the 5% level since the p-value of its coefficient 
is less than 0.05. Furthermore, we observe that the coefficient is negative (-0.003) and 
as a result the relationship between the two variables (COMB_RAM and DACCR) is ex-
pected to be also negative. In addition, we notice that the coefficient of the tree main 
independent variables (FAM, MANAG, INSTIT) are positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Consequently, it is expected that these variables will have a positive 
impact on the dependent variable of the model. Thus, an increase (decrease) of these 
variables will cause an increase (decrease) to the depended variable DACCR. Moreo-
ver, it is observed that the coefficient of the independent variable ROA is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level and therefore, it is expected a positive relation-
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ship between these variables (ROA, DACCR). Finally, we notice that the coefficients of 
the independent variables LEV, MB and BIG4 are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level and as a consequence a possible change of their values will not cause any effect 
on the dependent variable. At this point, it is worth mentioning that if we exclude the-
se variables from the model (since they are not statistically significant) and re-estimate 
the coefficients of the remaining variables, the latter will not be statistically significant 
at the 5% level. We can assume that there is an endogenous relationship between all 
the variables which provides avenues for further research. 
The next step of our empirical analysis includes the estimation of the coeffi-
cients of model (9). Again, the coefficients of the model were estimated with the ordi-
nary least squares method (OLS) and the results are presented in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: OLS Regression Results – Real Activities Manipulation 
Variable Coefficient 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
DACCR -0.803773 
-4.877252*** 
(0.0000) 
FAM 0.126733 
4.051315*** 
(0.0001) 
MANAG 0.281515 
8.140491*** 
(0.0000) 
INSTIT 0.227053 
7.185479*** 
(0.0000) 
MB -0.005060 
-0.896967 
(0.3705) 
LEV -0.007599 
-5.071921*** 
(0.0000) 
ROA 1.070106 
7.140657*** 
(0.0000) 
BIG4 -0.216002 
-3.299831*** 
(0.0011) 
C 0.017104 
0.625834 
(0.5320) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.139842 
DACCR, the value of discretionary accruals; FAM, family ownership; MANAG, managerial ownership; 
INSTIT, institutional ownership; MB, market to book value ratio; LEV, long-term debt to total assets ratio; ROA, net 
income to total assets ratio; BIG4, dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors; 0 otherwise). 
***, **, * Indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
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Table 4 indicates that the coefficient of the independent variable DACCR is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, which leads us to assume that the 
relationship between DACCR and COMB_RAM is negative. This fact validates the re-
sults of the first regression. We can also deduct that the coefficients of the three main 
independent variables (FAM, MANAG, INSTIT) are positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level and as a result we expect that these variables will have a positive im-
pact on the dependent variable (COMB_RAM). Table 4 also shows that the coefficients 
of the control variables LEV, ROA and BIG4 are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
As a consequence, a change of their values will cause a significant change at the value 
of the dependent variable. More accurately, the coefficient of LEV variable is negative 
and thus, an increase (decrease) of the variable will cause a decrease (increase) of the 
dependent variable’s value. The coefficient of ROA variable is positive and statistically 
significant which means that a positive (negative) alteration of its value will cause a 
positive (negative) alteration of the dependent variable. The coefficient of the dummy 
variable BIG4 is statistically significant indicating that the engagement of a Big 4 audi-
tor (DELOITE, KPMG, ERNST & YOUNG and PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS) will affect 
the value of the dependent variable. Finally, according to the findings of the second 
model, only MB variable is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, a change 
of this variable will not cause a statistically significant change of the dependent varia-
ble. However, it should be noted that the MB variable is not excluded from the model 
(although it is not statistically significant) because we assume that there is an endoge-
nous relationship between all the variables, as mentioned previously. 
The final step of our empirical analysis includes the estimation of the correla-
tion coefficients between the variables using the SPSS software. The Pearson correla-
tion coefficient was chosen since we employed the nonparametric test of normality 
(Kolmogorov – Smirnov) and we concluded that the variables are normally distributed. 
Our findings are presented in the Table 5 below. 
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Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 DACCR FAM MANAG INSTIT COMB_RAM MB LEV ROA 
DACCR 1.000        
FAM  0.094  1.000       
MANAG     -0.010 0.608***   1.000      
INSTIT     -0.114 -0.380*** -0.314***   1.000     
COMB_RAM   -0.118** 0.261***   0.399***  -0.074   1.000    
MB     -0.036 -0.114**   0.018   0.244***   0.128** 1.000   
LEV    -0.179***  0.050  -0.052   0.096  -0.253*** 0.105**  1.000  
ROA     0.443*** -0.073  -0.024  0.145***   0.343*** 0.251*** -0.001 1.000 
DACCR, the value of discretionary accruals; FAM, family ownership; MANAG, managerial ownership; 
INSTIT, institutional ownership; COMB_RAM, real activities manipulation; MB, market to book value ratio; LEV, long-
term debt to total assets ratio; ROA, net income to total assets ratio. 
***, **, * Indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
Table 5 shows that the correlation coefficient between the main explanatory 
variables (FAM, MANAG, INSTIT) is statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, 
the correlation coefficient between the variables FAM and MANAG is equal to 0.608 
which indicates a medium correlation between these two variables. Therefore, an in-
crease (decrease) of one variable by one unit will cause an increase (decrease) of the 
other variable by 0.6 units. FAM and INSTIT are negatively related since their correla-
tion coefficient is equal to -0.38. Hence, a positive (negative) alteration of one variable 
by one unit will cause a negative (positive) alteration of the other variable by 0.38 
units. Finally, the correlation coefficient between MANAG and INSTIT is equal to -0.314 
which shows a negative relationship between these two variables. An increase (de-
crease) of one variable by one unit will cause a decrease (increase) of the other by 0.31 
units. The correlations between the main explanatory variables and the two depend-
ent variables, which are mentioned above, are quite interesting. More accurately, the 
correlation coefficient between the DACCR variable and the three explanatory varia-
bles is not statistically significant at the 5% level. This fact suggests that a change in 
those three variables will not cause a statistically significant change of the dependent 
variable DACCR. This result is not opposed to the findings of the OLS regression model 
since the aforementioned correlation coefficients are estimated without taking into 
account the combining influences of the independent variables. Furthermore, Table 5 
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indicates that the correlation coefficient between FAM and COMB_RAM as well as 
MANAG and COMB_RAM is statistically significant at the 5% level, while the correla-
tion between INSTIT and COMB_RAM is not statistically significant. More specifically, 
the correlation coefficient between FAM and COMB_RAM is equal to 0.261, which 
shows a positive correlation between these two variables, while the correlation coeffi-
cient between MANAG and COMB_RAM is equal to 0.399 indicating a positive relation-
ship between them. It is also important to mention that the correlation coefficient be-
tween the dependent variables (DACCR, COMB_RAM) is negative and statistically sig-
nificant and as a consequence, an increase (decrease) of one variable will cause a de-
crease (increase) of the other. As a result, the coefficients, which are estimated with 
the OLS method, are validated.  
In addition, the analysis of Table 5 indicates that MB is significantly correlated 
(at the 5% level) with FAM, INSTIT and COMB_RAM, respectively, while it is not statis-
tically correlated with the other variables. The correlation coefficient between LEV var-
iable and DACCR, COMB_RAM as well as MB is statistically significant, while it is not 
statistically significant with the other variables. Finally, the correlation coefficient of 
ROA is not statistically significant only with FAM and MANAG. 
4.2. Interpretation of Findings 
The empirical analysis of Table 2 shows that the mean value of the FAM varia-
ble is 0.38 which indicates that 38% of a random Greek listed firm is expected to be-
long to a family. It is also observed that the mean value of the MANAG variable is 0.35 
which indicates that 35% of a company’s shares are held by managers (CEO or CFO). It 
is worth mentioning that the mean values of these two variables are almost equal. This 
phenomenon confirms the fact that managers of the family firm are also members of 
the controlling family in most cases of family-controlled companies. Furthermore, we 
noticed that the mean of the INSTIT variable is 0.06 which means that 6% of a random 
Greek listed firm is owned by institutional investors. In addition, the mean of BIG4 is 
equal to 0.15, indicating that a percentage of 15% of Greek listed firms are audited by 
a Big 4 company. At this point, it should be noted that the mean values of the two de-
pendent variables (DACCR and COMB_RAM) are equal to 0. However, it is inaccurate 
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to deduct that managers do not manipulate the reported earnings since, according to 
data, all firms manage earnings either upwardly or downwardly and as a consequence 
the mean tends to zero. The aforementioned data reflect the dominant presence of 
family ownership, suggesting that the vast majority of listed firms in Greece has family 
investors. 
Table 3 shows that, in model (8) where DACCR is the dependent variable, the 
coefficients of the ownership-related variables, FAM, MANAG and INSTIT are positive 
and statistically significant. More accurately, this fact indicates that the higher family 
ownership in a firm, the higher the magnitude of discretionary accounting accruals. 
Consistent with our family entrenchment effect hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), the findings 
of Fama and Jensen (1983), Fan and Wong (2002) as well as Bertrand et al. (2002) are 
confirmed. In addition, as in Cheng & Warfield (2005) and Guidry et al. (1999), we find 
that earnings management is significantly higher for companies with higher managerial 
ownership. This outcome corroborates our management entrenchment effect hypoth-
esis (Hypothesis 2) which suggests that managers manipulate earnings to maximize 
their personal fortune. Our third hypothesis (passive hands-off hypothesis) is also con-
firmed as we find that companies with higher institutional ownership have higher flex-
ibility to employ accruals in order to manage earnings. This result is consistent with 
Charitou et al. (2007) and Agnes Cheng & Reitenga (2009) suggesting that institutional 
investors could impel indirectly management to manipulate earnings. Regarding the 
other relevant control variables, it is important to note that the coefficient of the 
COMB_RAM variable, which is used as an explanatory variable in model (8), is negative 
and statistically significant. The latter means that companies can choose between the 
two mechanisms (discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation) employing 
the one that is less costly to them. Moreover, in model (8), the coefficient of ROA vari-
able is positive and statistically significant. As a result, it is concluded that the higher 
the profitability of a Greek listed firm the higher the level of earnings management. 
Finally, it is observed that the coefficients of LEV, MB and BIG4 variables are not statis-
tically significant, indicating that both the level of leverage and growth of a firm as well 
as the engagement of the four largest audit companies do not affect the magnitude of 
discretionary accounting accruals. 
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Table 4 shows that, in model (9) where COMB_RAM is the dependent variable, 
the coefficients of the main explanatory variables, FAM, MANAG and INSTIT are also 
positive and statistically significant which could be interpreted just like in model (8). 
More specifically, it is found again a significant negative relationship between the two 
dependent variables (DACCR and COMB_RAM). Furthermore, the coefficients of LEV 
and BIG4 are negative and statistically significant while the coefficient of ROA variable 
is positive and statistically significant. Consequently, a company’s leverage level as well 
as the engagement of a Big 4 auditor has a negative effect on real activities manipula-
tion which indicates that an increase in leverage level discourages managers from ma-
nipulating earnings in order to avoid the contractual debt restraints violation (see 
Jelinek 2007) and an increase in a Big 4 auditor engagement reduces the level of earn-
ings management. Finally, as in model (8), the higher the profitability of a Greek listed 
firm the higher the level of real activities manipulation. 
The analysis of Table 5 indicates that there are some particularly interesting 
correlations between the variables. More accurately, the correlation coefficient be-
tween the variables FAM and MANAG is 0.608 and statistically significant, suggesting 
that an 1% increase in a firm’s family ownership will cause an 0.6% increase in a firm’s 
managerial ownership. As a result, it is confirmed that, in the vast majority of family-
controlled companies, managers of the family firms are also members of the control-
ling family. A negative correlation between FAM and INSTIT (-0.38), which is also statis-
tically significant, shows that the shares held by institutional investors are declining by 
0.38% as the family ownership increases by 1%. Moreover, INSTIT variable is negatively 
correlated with MANAG variable accompanied with a statistically significant correla-
tion coefficient (-0.314), which suggests that an 1% increase in firm’s equity stakes 
owned by managers could cause a 0.314% decrease in institutional ownership. Since 
the correlation between FAM and MANAG is positive and the correlation between 
FAM and INSTIT is negative, it is only natural for the correlation between INSTIT and 
MANAG to be negative. In addition, the correlation coefficient between COMB_RAM 
and FAM is positive and statistically significant (0.261). Similarly, the correlation coeffi-
cient between COMB_RAM and MANAG is positive and statistically significant (0.399). 
These correlations indicate that the level of earnings management is increasing by 
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0.261% and 0.399%, respectively, as family ownership and managerial ownership are 
increasing by 1%. Last but not least, a negative correlation between COMB_RAM and 
DACCR (-0.118) which is also statistically significant, confirms once again the fact that 
Greek listed firms prefer to use one of the two earnings management methods (discre-
tionary accruals and real activities manipulation) possibly depending on cost factors. At 
this point, it is worth mentioning that correlation coefficients are, in general, below the 
0.9 threshold, which suggests that there are no serious statistical problems regarding 
multicollinearity (Pallant 2001). 
 
4.3. Sensitivity Analyses 
In order to enhance our analysis, ensuring the robustness of our findings, we 
perform a few sensitivity tests. Our first sensitivity test investigates the effect of the 
outliers on results. These outliers are influential observations (extreme values) and 
they are found in the variables MB, LEV and ROA. Therefore, to examine the robust-
ness of our findings we employ a winserization method, where outliers are defined as 
values which are equal to more than three standard deviations away from the mean 
(upwardly or downwardly). These extreme values are replaced by values which are 
equal to three standard deviations from the mean. The results, which are not reported 
here, do not alter significantly comparing to those presented previously in Table 3 and 
Table 4. 
According to several studies (Bushee 1998, 2001; Koh 2003), long-term and 
short-term oriented institutional investors can exist in a firm at the same time, oppos-
ing to the majority of studies (Majumdar and Nagarajan 1997; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam 1998), which claim that institutional investors are a homogenous 
group in the sense that they are either all long-term or short-term oriented investors. 
Bushee (1998) and Koh et al. (2003) find evidence of a relationship between institu-
tional ownership and earnings management which is non-linear. In order to examine 
this possibility, which suggest a non-linear association between institutional ownership 
and earnings management, models (8) and (9) are estimated again by including the 
squared INSTIT (INSTIT2). The unreported results are not significantly altered while the 
   
 -31- 
coefficient of INSTIT2 is not statistically significant. Therefore, there is no evidence sug-
gesting a non-linear relationship between institutional ownership and earnings man-
agement. 
Moreover, Wang’s (2006) findings suggest that there is a non-linear relation-
ship between family ownership and earnings management in the sense that, when the 
proportion of company’s stocks owned by a family is low, this relationship is negative, 
but, as the aforementioned proportion increases, the relationship becomes positive. 
Accordingly, models (8) and (9) are estimated again by including the squared variable 
FAM (FAM2) so as to examine the possibility of a non-linear relationship between fami-
ly ownership and earnings management. The results are qualitatively the same as our 
main findings presented in the earlier section. Therefore, there is no evidence suggest-
ing a non-linear relationship between family ownership and earnings management 
since the coefficient of FAM2 is not statistically significant. 
The above sensitivity analyses indicate that the findings of this study are robust 
after controlling the effect of different specification of the association between family 
ownership and earnings management, different specification of the association be-
tween institutional ownership and earnings management as well as the effect of influ-
ential observations (outliers). 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of ownership structure on a com-
pany’s earnings management strategies in Greece. For this purpose we selected a 
sample of 70 Greek listed firms for a five-year period, 2011 to 2015 (350 observations) 
and we attempted to divide ownership structure of these firms into three categories: 
family ownership, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. We also meas-
ured earnings management with two different methods: discretionary accruals and 
real activities manipulation. The empirical findings indicate that the ownership struc-
ture of these companies have an impact on the earnings management practices that 
they choose to employ. 
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Extant literature states two opposing views on the effects of each one of the 
ownership structures mentioned above (family ownership, managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership) on corporate earnings management. The first argues that con-
trolling families, managers and institutional investors could exacerbate earnings man-
agement. On the contrary, the second view argues that controlling families, managers 
and institutional investors could inhibit earnings management. Specifically, our survey 
shows that family ownership, managerial ownership as well as institutional ownership 
exacerbates earnings management activities. This result is consistent with the family 
entrenchment effect hypothesis, which suggests that controlling families have the ap-
propriate incentive and the opportunity to manage earnings for their own benefit, the 
management entrenchment effect hypothesis, which suggests that managers who 
possess a significant portion of a company’s equity have more incentive to manipulate 
reported earnings and finally, the passive hands-off hypothesis, which suggests that 
institutional investors may force managers to engage in earnings management strate-
gies. The aforementioned results are the same in both earnings management methods 
that we examine. Furthermore, our findings also reveal that there is more earnings 
management when a firm’s profitability is high and that there is less earnings man-
agement either when a company’s level of leverage is high or when there is an en-
gagement of a Big 4 auditor. 
In sum, our findings highlight that ownership structure of Greek listed firms is 
not efficient in order to constrain the likelihood of earnings management practices. 
Therefore, our study indicates that family ownership, managerial ownership and insti-
tutional ownership have a negative impact on the informational quality of earnings, 
and as a consequence undermine the quality of published financial data. Moreover, 
the majority of Greek companies are family-controlled and their managers are also 
family members (almost in all cases). This fact may cause them to manage the report-
ed earnings. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the negative relationship between our 
proxies for real activities manipulation and discretionary accruals indicates that com-
panies which engage in real activities manipulation are less likely to choose accrual-
based earnings management.  
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The findings of this study could contribute to the existing literature by conclud-
ing that, on average, family ownership, managerial ownership and institutional owner-
ship exacerbate earnings management and they do not provide effective monitoring of 
earnings management in Greek listed firms. Moreover, the results may be relevant for 
countries with highly concentrated ownership similar to that of Greece. Finally, inves-
tors and regulators may also benefit from the results because they provide insight into 
the effect of ownership structure on earnings quality. Thus, the results have implica-
tions for regulators who are searching for an appropriate model of ownership struc-
ture and for investors who want to protect their investments. 
However, this research is subject to several limitations. First, a limitation of this 
research is the relatively small sample size. Due to the global financial crisis of the last 
seven years, many companies are either delisted within the five-year period we exam-
ine (2011-2015) or their shares trading is under temporary suspension. Companies 
whose share trading is under surveillance are excluded, too. Second, our models con-
sist of control variables which are included in a large number of similar studies. Never-
theless, there are more alternatives which would be worth investigating in the sense 
that they could control for the impact of more or entirely different aspects of owner-
ship structure and earnings management. Additionally, another limitation could be the 
relatively small period that we examine. Our findings and limitations could provide a 
basis for further research. Future studies could conduct research examining more 
years and using a larger sample size. Finally, future research should add several cate-
gories of ownership structure (such as external blockholder ownership, foreign owner-
ship, etc), while the family ownership could be measured taking into account the num-
ber of generations and individuals of family members who are involved in family busi-
ness in order to assess the depth and width of dedication of these members 
(Astrachan et al. 2002). 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition 
TACC 
Total accruals of firm, measured as the difference between 
net income and cash flow from operations. 
DACCR 
The value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary ac-
cruals are calculated according to the cross-sectional modi-
fied Jones model. 
ABN_CFO Abnormal operating cash flows. 
ABN_PROD 
Abnormal production costs, where production costs are in-
terpreted as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in in-
ventory. 
ABN_DISEXP 
Abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary ex-
penses are the sum of Advertising, Research and Develop-
ment, and Selling General and Administrative Expenses. 
COMB_RAM 
A combined measure of real activities manipulation consist-
ing of the aggregation of ABN_CFO, ABN_PROD and 
ABN_DISEXP. 
FAM 
Family ownership which is measured as the proportion of 
company’s stocks directly or indirectly owned by a family, an 
individual or an unlisted firm that possesses at least 10 per-
cent of equity stakes or voting rights. 
MANAG 
Managerial ownership which is measured as the proportion 
of firm’s shares directly or indirectly owned by the manager 
(CEO or CFO). 
INSTIT 
Institutional ownership which is measured as the proportion 
of firm’s stocks owned by institutional investors who possess 
at least 5% of common stock. 
MB Market value of equity to book value of equity ratio. 
LEV Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
ROA Net income to total assets ratio. 
BIG4 
Dummy variable: 1 if the auditor is one of the big 4 companies 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
